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Abstract
Partisanship has been the object of extensive scholarly attention. Because individ-
ual partisanship seemed relatively stable and insensitive to short term forces, aggregate
partisanship was long thought to display no meaningful variation. This view was chal-
lenged by MacKuen et al. (1989), who found that aggregate partisanship in the United
States is a⁄ected by consumer con￿dence and presidential approval. This paper studies
aggregate party identi￿cation in Germany, and how it has evolved in the past thirty
years. Speci￿cally, we analyze the impact of consumer con￿dence and government
approval on party identi￿cation. We conclude that rises in consumer con￿dence and
government approval do indeed lead to increases in identi￿cation with the main gov-
erning parties.
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11 Introduction
The nature of party identi￿cation (ID) has been the subject of intense debate during the
past 50 years. Campbell et al. (1960) de￿ned party ID as ￿ the sense of personal attachment
which the individual feels towards the party of his choice￿ . They noticed that, compared
to other political attitudes, party ID was relatively stable in the United States (US). The
observed stability was often explained as a result of socio-psychologic forces, as in reference
or small group theory, and brought about the concept of party ID as an unmoved mover.1 In
this view, Party ID is a non-political attitude that can nonetheless in￿ uence an individual￿ s
opinion about politics.
The concept of party ID as an unmoved mover became a matter of dispute in the 1980s.
In his seminal study, Fiorina (1981) described party ID as a ￿ running tally￿of retrospective
evaluations of candidates￿performance in o¢ ce. Fiorina￿ s formulation constituted a recon-
ceptionalization of party ID, more rooted in rational choice theory than reference group
theory (Thomassen and Rosema 2011). Franklin and Jackson (1983) argued that ￿ [party]
identi￿cations are more than the results of a set of early socializing experiences, possibly
reinforced by subsequent social and political activity. They are a person￿ s accumulated
evaluations from previous elections and are dependent upon the events and the actions of
political leaders during these elections and during subsequent terms in o¢ ce￿ . They con-
cluded that changes in party ID originate in shifts in the perceived party proximities to their
own preferences. Achen (2002) explained party ID as the result of a continuous Bayesian
updating process with respect to expected future bene￿ts from a party and its candidates.
The lion￿ s share of the literature focuses on party ID at the micro level. To the extent that
individual changes in party ID are rare, changes in the aggregate distribution of party ID
should be minor as well. Shifts in macropartisanship, which can be considered as aggregate
party ID, should then be limited and only occur in a gradual fashion.
2MacKuen et al. (1989) presented evidence that is inconsistent with this view. They
showed that macropartisanship ￿ uctuates in response to changes in consumer con￿dence
and presidential approval. Their analysis was replicated by Green et al. (1998), who found
considerably less evidence of partisan ￿ uctuation. They found that short-term e⁄ects (con-
sumer sentiment and presidential approval) have only half of the e⁄ect that MacKuen et
al. suggested. They concluded that the earlier view of realignment remained persuasive:
partisanship is generally stable, except for occasional signi￿cant realignments.
The focus of this paper will be on the partisan movements of the electorate rather than
the changing partisanship of individual citizens. We will study the macro-level relationship
between party ID and short term forces such as consumer con￿dence and government ap-
proval in Germany. The next section discusses the problems one faces when studying this
relationship in multi-party political systems. The data we used are described in the third
section. The fourth section analyzes the dynamics of macropartisanship and the chronolog-
ical order of the relationship between short term forces, such as consumer con￿dence and
government approval, and macropartisanship. The ￿fth section quanti￿es these relationships
using two di⁄erent approaches. In our ￿rst approach, we focus on the partisan balance be-
tween the two main German parties. This facilitates comparison with previous studies of US
partisanship, and gives us an idea about the the impact of short term forces on the partisan
balance between the parties that compete for the German Chancellorship. In our second
approach, we focus on the partisanship of the four parties that were members of coalition
governments during the sample period. We look at each of these parties￿share in the total
number of party identi￿ers, and analyze the impact of consumer con￿dence and government
approval. The sixth section concludes.
We ￿nd that consumer con￿dence and government approval do indeed have an impact on
identi￿cation with the main German parties. When we look at the partisan balance between
the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
3(SPD), we observe that rises in consumer con￿dence shift the partisan balance in favor of
the governing party. When we include both consumer con￿dence and government approval,
we ￿nd that they are jointly signi￿cant. When we look at each of the parties separately,
the e⁄ects of consumer con￿dence and government approval remain signi￿cant for the SPD
and the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP). For the CDU, only the e⁄ect of government
approval is signi￿cant. Of all the voters who identify with one of the four main parties,
the FDP-identi￿ers seem to be the most responsive to changes in consumer con￿dence and
government approval.
2 Macropartisanship in Multiparty Systems
Most studies of individual and aggregate partisanship take place in the US context. Over
the past decades, many scholars have demonstrated that these concepts may not be readily
applicable to European politics. We now brie￿ y discuss three reasons why this may not
apply.
First, the importance of party ID as a determinant of political attitudes might be di⁄erent
in Europe. Shively (1979) develops a functional model of party ID, treating party ID as the
result of the individuals￿need for guidance in making political decisions. He ￿nds weak ties
between European citizens and political parties, and argues that these ￿ have resulted from
the prevalence of strong ties to a class or religion, which have obviated the need for direct
ties to any party, per se￿ .
Thomassen and Rosema (2011) ￿nd that ￿ in the Netherlands (...) party ID and party
vote tend to coincide and, furthermore, to the extent that they do not, reported party ID is
less stable than vote choice￿ . They interpret the strong correlation of party ID and actual
vote choice in two di⁄erent ways. On the one hand, their ￿ndings can be interpreted, in
4light of Shively￿ s model, as an indication that party ID is less important in Europe. On
the other hand, they argue that ￿ in European parliamentary systems political parties and
not individual politicians are the principal actors mediating between voters and government
institutions, (...) o⁄ering few incentives for voters to deviate from their party preference in
favour of a candidate from another party￿ . Their second interpretation implies that party
ID is more powerful in Europe than in the US.
In Germany, Kaase (1976) found such strong correlation between party ID and actual
vote choice that doubts arose about the conceptual independence of party ID from vote
choice. Schmidt and Segatti (2011) state that this correlation has weakened, because of the
bipolar political landscape and the fact that on both sides of the landscape voters can choose
from among multiple parties. This allows voters to vote against their long-standing party
preference without changing ideological sides.
Second, a problem related to this last point is that in a multiparty context a number
of parties are likely to be similar to each other and that multiple party ID should therefore
not be surprising (Weisberg 1999). To tackle this problem, Schickler and Green (1997) as
well as Garry (2007) propose some re￿nements in the way that partisanship is measured
in multiparty systems. These re￿nements include party-by-party measures of party ID and
positive as well as negative party ID.
A third set of complications arises when we replicate US studies of macropartisanship
and its relation to presidential approval and consumer con￿dence. In these US ￿studies,
macropartisanship is de￿ned as the number of Democrat identi￿ers divided by the sum of
Democrat and Republican identi￿ers. Presidential approval is de￿ned as the percentage
of respondents who approve of the way the president is handling his job. However, the
conventional operationalization of these concepts might not be appropriate once we move
outside the US party system. A key explanatory variable, presidential approval, as well as
macropartisanship itself have to be rede￿ned.
5As multiparty systems often induce coalition governments, government approval ratings
are not as clearly attributable to a speci￿c party as they are in the US. If we want the same
level of precision as in US studies that relate partisanship to presidential approval, we need
approval ratings for every party (in government and in opposition). Unfortunately, these
data are often not available, and they are not available in Germany, the country we focus
on.
It is not obvious how to translate the speci￿cation of macropartisanship used in US
studies to multiparty systems. If we de￿ne macropartisanship party-by-party (the number
of party x- identi￿ers divided by the total number of party identi￿ers), we need as many
analyses as there are parties. We cannot express the party ID share of all parties in a single
number, contrary to US ￿studies. In the US, we know that the Republicans￿share is .6 if
the Democrats￿share is .4 and we disregard independents. Furthermore, the US approach is
ill suited for countries in which the number of parties varies over time. If a party dissolves
for example, the share of the remaining parties will increase (ceteris paribus).
An alternative operationalization of macropartisanship focuses on the two largest parties
and discards the identi￿ers of other parties. This approach only makes sense if there are two
parties that dominate all others.
In this paper, we de￿ne macropartisanship in two di⁄erent ways. Similar to the studies
of US macropartisanship discussed above, we discard the respondents who do not identify
with any party in both approaches. In our ￿rst approach we focus on the two largest parties.
In Germany these are the CDU and SPD.2 In this approach, we discard all non-CDU-non-
SPD identi￿ers, and treat the German political system as a two-party system. We de￿ne
macropartisanship at time t (MP1t) as the ratio of CDU-identi￿ers to the sum of all CDU
and SPD-identi￿ers. As all coalitions in the period studied were led by one of these two
parties, we believe that the data on government approval are closely connected to the voters￿
approval of the CDU or SPD members in government.
6MP1t =
# CDU-identi￿erst
# CDU-identi￿erst + # SPD-identi￿erst
In the second approach, we de￿ne macropartisanship at time t (MP2t) as the proportion
of all party identi￿ers who identify with a speci￿c party. This operationalization requires as
many variables for macropartisanship as there are parties. An advantage of this method is
that we can estimate the e⁄ects of short term forces on party ID for all parties separately.
MP2it =
# identi￿ers party i
n X
i=1
# identi￿ers party i
; where n is the number of parties in the political system.
Both manners of operationalizing macropartisanship in the German context have their
advantages and disadvantages. The ￿rst approach, while it ignores some fundamental aspects
of German politics, has the advantage that the relationship between party ID and government
approval is not blurred by the fortunes of coalition partners. Furthermore, Figure 1 shows
that the CDU and the SPD make up the lion￿ s share of German party identi￿ers. So
discarding voters who identify with another party may not be that much of a problem.
In the Figure, the various lines represent the parties￿shares of party identi￿ers. PDS stands
for Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus.
￿ Figure 1 about here ￿
If we were to study the stability of party ID as such, rather than its relationship with
consumer con￿dence and government approval, the second approach would be the most
suitable. This approach has the advantage that shifts in partisanship from the two main
parties to smaller parties (and vice versa) are not overlooked. However, problems then arise
when we model partisanship as a function of (consumer con￿dence and) government approval.
Ideally, we would isolate the part of government approval that appertains to the coalition
7party in question. The rising popularity of an FDP-minister, for example, might translate
into a rise in government approval as well as a decline in CDU-partisanship. Furthermore,
it is far from unthinkable that we see a rise in government approval while the popularity of
a minor coalition partner falls.
3 Data
We use data frommonthly telephone surveys conducted by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen Mannheim
over the period 1977-2005.3 Until 1989, these surveys were conducted in the former West-
Germany, excluding West-Berlin. From 1990 onwards, West-Berlin and the former East-
Germany were included in the sample. Because the number of observations varied consid-
erably over the sample period, we aggregated the monthly data into quarterly data. As a
result, measurement error can be considered a secondary concern. The number of quarterly
observations varied between 962 and 6414. The mean number of observations is 3224, and
the standard deviation is 788.
The party ID variables are based on the following survey question: ￿ In Germany, a lot
of people tend to lean towards a particular party for a long time, although they vote for
another party now and then. Generally speaking, do you tend to lean towards a particular
party? If yes, which one?￿ 4
8The series on government approval is based on the following survey question: ￿ Are you
rather happy or rather unhappy with what the current government has done so far?￿ Re-
spondents were asked to answer this question on a scale from +5 (very happy) to -5 (very
unhappy). The variable government approval is the mean of the respondents￿answers.
The series on consumer con￿dence is based on four di⁄erent survey questions. In the
surveys, the respondents were asked to evaluate Germany￿ s current economic situation, Ger-
many￿ s economic situation the following year, their own current economic situation and their
own economic situation the following year. All evaluations were expressed on a scale from
1 to 5. The variable consumer con￿dence was constructed by taking the mean of these four
numbers. If some of the data were missing, we took the mean of the available values. Our
speci￿cation is similar to that of the Consumer Con￿dence Index (CCI) and the University
of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS). The latter index was used by MacKuen et
al. (1989).56
4 The dynamics of macropartisanship
In this section we describe the common movements in macropartisanship, government ap-
proval and consumer con￿dence. We derive a prima facie chronological relationship between
these variables, and assess the validity of our hypotheses using Granger causality tests. We
then move on to the internal dynamics of macropartisanship, which we describe following
the Box-Jenkins approach.
In this section we follow our ￿rst approach to macropartisanship only. That is, we focus
on the two largest parties. The reason for this is twofold. First, this approach facilitates the
9comparison with previous US ￿studies (e.g. MacKuen et al. (1989), Green et al. (1998)).
Second, when we want to examine the chronological relationship between government ap-
proval and macropartisanship, it is important that approval ratings are attributable to the
party in question.
4.1 Movements in consumer con￿dence, government approval and
macropartisanship
The sample period (1977-2007) covers ten coalition governments, of which four were led
by the SPD and six by the CDU. Figure 2 traces the relative partisanship of the governing
party (i.e. the proportion of party identi￿ers that support the Chancellor￿ s party) along with
consumer con￿dence and government approval. In the Figure, the values of consumer con-
￿dence and government approval are standardized (left scales). The shares of all identi￿ers
who identify with the governing party (SPD under the Schmidt and Schr￿der governments
and CDU under the Kohl and Merkel governments) can be found on the right scales. To get
a clear view of the common movements, all series have been smoothed by taking a simple
three-quarter moving average (MA), the average of the preceding, current and following quar-
ter, as was done by MacKuen et al. (1989). Prima facie, the Figure above reveals that the
relationship between the variables has the chronological order suggested by MacKuen et al.
(1989). Movements in consumer con￿dence seem to precede changes in government approval,
which in turn precede changes in partisanship. This relationship seems most pronounced for
the Kohl governments.
￿ Figure 2 about here ￿
An external event we should take into account in our analysis is the fall of the Berlin wall
and the reuni￿cation of Germany. This event might have in￿ uenced the partisan balance,
10approval ratings and consumer sentiment in the short run. Furthermore, we should consider
that the structural relationship between the variables of interest may have changed at the
time of reuni￿cation. For these reasons, we duplicated our analysis using the subsample of
the former West Germany, which did not alter the results signi￿cantly. We also tested (using
the full sample) whether there was a structural break at the time of reuni￿cation using Chow
tests (Chow, 1960). A Chow test examines whether regression coe¢ cients are signi￿cantly
di⁄erent in two subsamples (pre- and post-uni￿cation). All so-called Chow tests rejected the
hypothesis of a structural break.
Before we analyze this apparent relationship quantitatively, we formally test whether
variations in consumer con￿dence and government approval cause (or rather ￿ Granger-cause￿ )
variations in macropartisanship. Granger causality tests assess the joint signi￿cance of lagged
values of a variable in a regression that includes lagged values of the dependent variable
(Granger, 1969). We conduct these tests because we want to be con￿dent that our regressors
are not endogeneous. As noted by van der Eijk and Franklin (2007) people￿ s assessment of
the state of the economy can be caused by rather than cause party ID. That is, people
who identify with the governing (opposition) party will overestimate (underestimate) the
quality of economic policy. The results are displayed in Table 1. In this Table, C, A and
M stand for government approval, macropartisanship and consumer con￿dence, respectively.
The implication mark ) means ￿ Granger causes￿ . The reported values are p-values for the
F-statistics of joint signi￿cance of the lagged values of the independent variable.
￿ Table 1 about here ￿
The chronological relationship between consumer con￿dence and government is clear.
The value in the upper left (0.0205) is smaller than 0.1, and thus indicate that the ￿rst lag
of consumer con￿dence contains information about the current value of government approval,
over and above the information contained in the lagged value of government approval. In
11the opposite chronological order, we ￿nd no evidence for such a relationship (0.5395 > 0.1).
The same holds for the relationship between consumer con￿dence and macropartisanship.
The chronological relationship between government approval and macropartisanship is
more ambiguous. The ￿rst three lags of both variables contain information about the current
value of the other variable, over and above the information contained in the lagged value
of this other variable. However, if we include four lags, the signi￿cance disappears in one
chronological speci￿cation. The Granger tests thus indicate that changes in government
approval precede changes in macropartisanship.
We conclude from the Granger tests that there is strong evidence for the order of causality
suggested above. Changes in consumer con￿dence do indeed precede changes in government
approval and macropartisanship, and that changes in government approval precede changes
in macropartisanship. Before we examine whether the inclusion of control variables a⁄ects
the results, we will take a look at the internal dynamics of our dependent variable.
4.2 The internal dynamics of macropartisanship
In this section, we will explore the dynamic structure of macropartisanship by examining
how current values depend on past values. The objective is to statistically assess the stability
of the partisan balance.
Like any other time series, macropartisanship may have an internal structure, such as
autocorrelation, seasonal variation or a trend, that should be taken into account. If the
dependent and (some) independent variables have a similar autoregressive structure, we
may ￿nd substantial correlation even if the variables are in fact independent. Therefore, if
we want to avoid biased regression coe¢ cients in our macropartisanship models, we have
12to include the lags of macropartisanship that shape its current value. We will use a Box-
Jenkins approach to uncover the dynamic characteristics of macropartisanship (Box and
Jenkins, 1970).
Our ￿rst step is to plot the correlations between macropartisanship at time t and t-k.
This autocorrelogram of macropartisanship is presented in Figure 3. The shape of the au-
tocorrelogram indicates which kind of autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model might
be appropriate. In this case, the rapidly declining autocorrelations suggest an autoregressive
model. Figure 4 presents the so-called partial autocorrellogram, which graphs the correlation
of macropartisanship between time t and t-k that is not accounted for by lags 1 through k-1.
Partial autocorrelatograms are useful in identifying the order of an autoregressive model.
The partial autocorrelation of an AR(p) process is zero at lag p+1 and greater. In the
Figures below, (partial) autocorrelations are signi￿cant if they are not in the shaded area.
The lack of signi￿cant partial autocorrelations at lags 2 and higher indicates that the order
of the autoregressive component does not exceed one.
￿ Figure 3 about here ￿
￿ Figure 4 about here ￿
Next, we examine whether the AR(1) model we identi￿ed above outperforms other ARMA
models. Although there is no waterproof procedure to identify the best model, a frequently
used test consists of comparing the values of ￿ information criteria￿of several models. Infor-
mation criteria are statistics that express which model ￿ts the data best, taking the risk of
over￿tting into account. Lower values indicate better measures. We will use two common
criteria, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1974) and the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 1978). Both criteria are relative measures of the information
lost when a given model is used to describe reality. The AIC penalizes including additional
13variables less strongly than the BIC, and has theoretical advantages over the BIC (Burnham
and Anderson 2002, Yang 2005). Both criteria indicate that the AR(1) model is better than
alternative ARMA models.
￿ Table 2 about here ￿
The regression results of the AR(1) model are presented in Table 3. The parameter of
interest in this model is the coe¢ cient on lagged macropartisanship. We ￿nd this coe¢ cient
to be 0.739 (the standard error is 0.067), which means that macropartisanship is mean-
reverting in a gradual manner.7 If macropartisanship is one unit above its long term mean
today, it will be .734 = :28 units above its long-term mean next year. When we compare our
estimates with those of US ￿macropartisanship, we see that the ARMA structure is similar,
as could be expected. However, the rate at which macropartisanship reverts to its mean is
(a lot) higher in Germany. Green et al.(1998) estimate an AR(1) coe¢ cient of .95, using
quarterly data. This means that if macropartisanship is one unit above its mean today, it
will be .954 = :81 units above its long-term mean next year.
￿ Table 3 about here ￿
5 The e⁄ects of short-term forces on macropartisan-
ship
In this section, we quantify the relations between government approval, consumer con￿dence
and macropartisanship. We start by assessing the impact of these short term forces on the
balance between CDU and SPD-identi￿ers. This is our ￿rst approach. We then replicate
14this analysis on a party-by-party basis. This second approach allows us to investigate which
parties are most a⁄ected by movements in short-term variables such as consumer con￿dence
and government approval. In the appendix, we present impulse functions that allow us to
examine how long it takes for the impact of a shock in consumer con￿dence or government
approval on macropartisanship to die out.
5.1 First approach: Germany as a two-party system
MacKuen et al. (1989) model macropartisanship as a function of consumer con￿dence and
presidential approval. They include an extensive set of control variables in their regressions,
such as administration dummies, inauguration dummies and event (e.g. Watergate) dum-
mies. Green et al. (1998) criticize the inclusion of this extensive set, arguing that it ￿ risks
over￿tting the model and undercutting the apparent autoregressive character of macropar-
tisanship￿ . In our analysis, we will restrict control variables to Chancellor dummies and
inauguration dummies.8
Another remarkable feature of MacKuen et al.￿ s analysis is the way in which they op-
erationalize presidential approval. They ￿rst model presidential approval as a function of
consumer con￿dence, historical events and administration dummies. They then use these
estimates to ￿ purge approval of the variance attributable to consumer sentiment￿ , i.e. they
construct a new variable ￿ political approval￿that equals presidential approval minus 0.29
(the coe¢ cient of consumer con￿dence in their presidential approval model) times consumer
con￿dence. For the sake of comparability, we will also consider a political approval variable.
Speci￿cally, we estimate the e⁄ect of consumer con￿dence at time t-1 (Con:Conf:t￿1) on
government approval at time t(Gov:App:t) as follows:
15Gov:App:t = ￿0 + ￿1Gov:App:t￿1 + ￿2Con:Conft￿1 + ￿Xt + "t;
where Xt is a vector of control dummies, the ￿
0s and ￿0s are regression coe¢ cients, and "t
is the error term. The control dummies are the aforementioned coalition and inauguration
dummies.
The results of this regression are summarized in Table 4. Lagged consumer con￿dence and
lagged approval are both highly signi￿cant. Following MacKuen et al. (1989), we generate
a new variable ￿ political approval￿(Pol:App:t) based on these estimates. This variable is
identi￿ed as follows:
Pol:App:t = Gov:App:t ￿ ￿2Con:Conf:t￿1
￿ Table 4 about here ￿
Following Green et al. (1998), we estimate three di⁄erent models of macropartisanship.9
The results of these models can be found in Table 5. At times when the CDU was part of
the opposition, the values of consumer con￿dence and government approval were multiplied
by -1. Our ￿rst model of macropartisanship regresses macropartisanship on its lagged value,
lagged consumer con￿dence and control variables. Similar to the US studies, lagged consumer
con￿dence has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on macropartisanship.
￿ Table 5 about here ￿
The second model adds lagged government approval. This variable has no signi￿cant
e⁄ect on macropartisanship. Furthermore, consumer con￿dence is no longer individually
signi￿cant. Both lagged variables remain jointly signi￿cant at the 5 percent level however.10
16The third model replaces government approval by political approval. The latter has no
signi￿cant e⁄ect on macropartisanship. Consumer con￿dence remains signi￿cant and its
e⁄ect is of similar magnitude as in the ￿rst model.
In general, we can conclude that the German data are consistent with the thesis of MacK-
uen et al. (1989) that macropartisanship is partially determined by short term forces such
as consumer con￿dence and government approval. The coe¢ cient of consumer con￿dence is
individually signi￿cant in the ￿rst and third model. This signi￿cance disappears when we
add government approval, even though the coe¢ cients are jointly signi￿cant.
5.2 Second approach: party-by-party macropartisanship
In this section, we re-examine the e⁄ects of short term forces on the partisan balance on a
party-by-party basis. We focus on those parties that were part of a coalition government
during the sample period. These are CDU, SPD, FDP and B￿ndnis 90/Die Gr￿nen (Gr￿-
nen). For each party, we examine whether their shares of party identi￿ers are in￿ uenced
by government approval and consumer con￿dence. For each of the regressions below, the
values of government approval and consumer con￿dence have been multiplied by -1 whenever
the party in question was not part of the coalition government. For each party, we regress
the party￿ s share of the party identi￿ers on lagged government approval (model 1), lagged
consumer con￿dence (model 2), and both lagged government approval and lagged consumer
con￿dence (model 3). In all models, we include the lagged value of the dependent variable
as a regressor.11
Table 6 contains the results for the SPD. As expected, government approval has a positive
e⁄ect on SPD-partisanship when the SPD is part of the governing coalition, and a negative
e⁄ect otherwise (model 1). The same applies when we examine the e⁄ects of consumer
con￿dence (model 2). When both independent variables are included in the regression, only
17the e⁄ect of consumer con￿dence remains signi￿cant. This could indicate that in the short
term, SPD-identi￿cation is only a⁄ected by those policies that a⁄ect the economic climate.
￿ Table 6 about here ￿
The results of our three models of CDU-macropartisanship are displayed in Table 7.
Government approval seems to have a highly signi￿cant and rather strong e⁄ect on the
relative number of CDU-identi￿ers. Consumer con￿dence however, has no signi￿cant e⁄ect.
This could indicate that CDU-identi￿ers respond to the performance of current political
leaders in general, regardless of the economic climate.
￿ Table 7 about here ￿
In Table 8, the results of the models of FDP-macropartisanship are presented. As in the
models of SPD-macropartisanship, both independent variables are highly signi￿cant when we
include them separately (models 1 and 2), and only consumer con￿dence remains individually
signi￿cant in model 3. The coe¢ cients are smaller than those in our SPD-models. However,
taking into account that the mean FDP-share of all identi￿ers is almost ten times smaller
than the mean SPD-share, we can say that FDP-identi￿ers are more responsive to changes in
government approval and consumer con￿dence. This is in line with the ￿ndings of Lohmann,
Brady and Rivers (1997), who study the e⁄ects of German GNP growth rates on vote shares
in the period 1961-1989. They ￿nd that of all parties, the FDP￿ s vote share is most a⁄ected
by retrospective voting.
￿ Table 8 about here ￿
Finally, the results of our models for the Gr￿nen are presented in Table 9. None of the
models produce signi￿cant coe¢ cients for lagged consumer con￿dence or lagged government
18approval. This indicates that citizens do not identify with the Gr￿nen because of the current
economic and political climate, as we would expect for an environmental party.
￿ Table 9 about here ￿
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied party identi￿cation in Germany, and how it has evolved in the past
thirty years. Speci￿cally, we analyzed the impact of consumer con￿dence and government
approval on party identi￿cation. We conclude that in general, rises in consumer con￿dence
and government approval do indeed lead to increases in identi￿cation with the main governing
party. Our results thus con￿rm MacKuen et al.￿ s (1989) thesis that aggregate party ID is
not stable, but changes in response to movements in consumer con￿dence and government
approval.
Since coalition governments cloud the relationship between government approval ratings
and the partisan balance, we speci￿ed macropartisanship in two di⁄erent ways. In our ￿rst
approach, we de￿ned macropartisanship as the partisan balance between the two main Ger-
man parties. In our second approach, we speci￿ed macropartisanship party-by-party. When
we look at the partisan balance between CDU and SPD, we observe that rises in consumer
con￿dence shift the partisan balance in favor of the governing party. The same holds for
government approval. When we include both variables in our model, their coe¢ cients are
individually insigni￿cant, even though they remain jointly signi￿cant at the 5% level. When
we look at each of the parties separately, the e⁄ects of consumer con￿dence and government
approval remain signi￿cant for the SPD and the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP). For the
CDU, only the e⁄ect of government approval is signi￿cant. Of all the citizens who identify
19with one of the four main parties, the FDP-identi￿ers seem to be the most responsive to
changes in consumer con￿dence and government approval.
207 Appendix: Impulse Response Functions
The impulse response functions presented below describe how partisanship of a particu-
lar party reacts over time to an exogeneous shock. The impact of a shock in consumer
con￿dence or government approval on partisanship might be distributed over time. The im-
pulse response functions are constructed from the estimates of a vector autoregression (VAR)
model that relates consumer con￿dence and government approval to macropartisanship. The
models include two lags of macropartisanship and two lags of either consumer con￿dence or
government approval.
We assume that all variables are on their long-term mean prior to period 0. In period
0, an exogeneous shock results in a one standard deviation increase in consumer con￿dence
or government approval. The impact of this shock on the values of macropartisanship in
periods 1 to 10 is illustrated in Figures 5 through 7. We will only discuss the variables of
which we found signi￿cant results in the models we estimated.
Figure 5 presents the impact of a shock in government approval on the partisan share of
the CDU. We can see that this impact is largest in period 1 and that the e⁄ects of the shock
die out slowly.
￿ Figure 5 about here ￿
The e⁄ects of a shock in consumer con￿dence or government approval on SPD partisan-
ship is depicted in Figure 6. We see that consumer con￿dence has a small negative impact
in period 1 and a positive impact thereafter. The e⁄ect of a shock in government approval
is reaches its maximum in period 7.
￿ Figure 6 about here ￿
21The impulse response functions of consumer con￿dence and government approval on
FDP-partisanship are presented in Figure 7. Government approval has a small negative
e⁄ect in period 1, and a positive impact thereafter. The e⁄ects of a shock in consumer
con￿dence are positive and die out slowly.
￿ Figure 7 about here ￿
Notes
1see Campbell et al. (1960), and Miller (1991).
2In this paper, we treat the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) and the Christlich Soziale Union
(CSU) as a single party. We refer to this party as CDU.
3The data are available at the Zentralarchiv f￿r Empirische Sozialforschung of the University of K￿ln, or
via zacat.gesis.org.
4In German: "In der Bundesrepublik/Deutschland neigen viele Leute l￿ngere Zeit einer bestimmten
politischen Partei zu, obwohl sie auch ab und zu eine andere Partei w￿hlen. Wie ist das bei Ihnen: Neigen
Sie - ganz allgemein gesprochen - einer bestimmten Partei zu? Wenn ja, welcher?"
5The CCI is based on the data from a monthly survey of 5000 US households. The survey consists of
￿ve questions on the following topics: i) current business conditions, ii) business conditions for the next six
months, iii) current employment conditions, iv) employment conditions for the next six months, v) total
family income for the next six months. After all surveys are collected, each question￿ s positive responses are
divided by the sum of its positive and negative responses.
6The ICS is based on a monthly telephone survey of US households. The Index is aggregated from ￿ve
questions on the following topics: i) personal ￿nancial situation now and a year ago, ii) personal ￿nancial
situation one year from now, iii) overall ￿nancial condition of business for the next twelve months, iv) overall
￿nancial condition of business for the next ￿ve years, v) current attitude toward buying major household
items.
7Macropartisanship is mean-reverting because the coe¢ cient on its ￿rst lag is smaller than one. If this
coe¢ cient were (close to) one it would be a random walk. Coe¢ cients larger than one induce "exploding
series". In our model, the latter two cases do not occur, as macropartisanship is bound between 0 and 1.
228In all regressions below, we discarded the observations of the dependent variable in the ￿rst quarter a
Chancellor takes o¢ ce. The reason for this is that we would otherwise regress the partisan share of a new
Chancellor￿ s party on government approval of the previous Chancellor￿ s government.
9The exact form of these models is as follows:
Model 1: MP1t = ￿0 + ￿1MP1t￿1 + ￿2Cons:Cont￿1 + ￿3Kohl + ￿4Schr￿ oder + ￿5Merkel + "
Model 2: MP1t = ￿0 + ￿1MP1t￿1 + ￿2Cons:Cont￿1 + ￿3Gov:Apprt￿1: + ￿4Kohl + ￿5Schr￿ oder +
￿6Merkel + "
Model 3: MP1t = ￿0 + ￿1MP1t￿1 + ￿2Cons:Cont￿1 + ￿3Pol:Apprt￿1: + ￿4Kohl + ￿5Schr￿ oder +
￿6Merkel + "
10The F(2,86)-value is 3.73. The corresponding p-value is 0.0280.
11We also ran the regressions including political approval as an independent variable. The results of these
regressions were similar.
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Table 1: Granger causality tests.
C ) A A ) C C ) M M ) C A ) M M ) A
1 lag 0.0205 0.5395 0.0934 0.2972 0.0019 0.0315
2 lags 0.1177 0.4268 0.2436 0.4723 0.0101 0.0326
3 lags 0.2908 0.6585 0.3655 0.7535 0.0038 0.0306
4 lags 0.3990 0.7268 0.3184 0.9137 0.0114 0.1018
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95% CI impulse response function: government approval
step
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Table 4: Government Approval.
Coe⁄. p-value
L.Government Approval 0.668￿￿￿ 0.000








31Table 5: Macropartisanship models: First approach.
model 1 model 2 model 3
coe⁄. p-value coe⁄. p-value coe⁄. p-value
L.Macropartisanship 0.633￿￿￿ 0.000 0.545￿￿￿ 0.000 0.590￿￿￿ 0.000
L.Consumer Conf. 5.049￿￿ 0.024 2.842 0.288 5.077￿￿ 0.039
L.Gov. Approval 5.583 0.152
L.Political Approval 0.016 0.996
Merkel 0.002 0.824 -0.002 0.846 0.005 0.799
Schroeder 0.003 0.723 -0.002 0.829 0.006 0.767
Kohl -0.010 0.201 -0.013 0.104 -0.011 0.602
Constant 0.189￿￿￿ 0.000 0.238￿￿￿ 0.000 0.208￿￿￿ 0.000
Observations 93 93 76
R2 0.624 0.632 0.649
Adjusted R2 0.602 0.607 0.619
Table 6: Macropartisanship models: SPD.
model 1 model 2 model 3
Coe⁄. p-value Coe⁄. p-value Coe⁄. p-value
L.Rel. Pship SPD 0.665￿￿￿ 0.000 0.668￿￿￿ 0.000 0.654￿￿￿ 0.000
L.Gov. Approval 5.716￿￿ 0.020 1.675 0.595
Merkel -0.024￿￿￿ 0.009 -0.016 0.147 -0.016 0.164
Schroeder -0.012￿ 0.080 -0.008 0.344 -0.007 0.494
Kohl -0.005 0.392 0.003 0.681 0.004 0.603
L.Consumer Conf. 6.039￿￿￿ 0.006 5.257￿￿ 0.047
Constant 0.150￿￿￿ 0.000 0.143￿￿￿ 0.000 0.147￿￿￿ 0.000
Observations 120 93 93
R2 0.758 0.744 0.745
Adjusted R2 0.747 0.729 0.727
Table 7: Macropartisanship models: CDU.
model 1 model 2 model 3
Coe⁄. p-value Coe⁄. p-value Coe⁄. p-value
L.Rel. Pship CDU 0.479￿￿￿ 0.000 0.645￿￿￿ 0.000 0.416￿￿￿ 0.001
L.Gov. Approval 8.681￿￿￿ 0.001 10.605￿￿ 0.017
Merkel -0.023￿￿￿ 0.009 -0.018￿￿ 0.041 -0.036￿￿￿ 0.002
Schroeder -0.009 0.162 -0.007 0.341 -0.021￿￿ 0.024
Kohl -0.012￿￿ 0.021 -0.015￿￿ 0.024 -0.025￿￿￿ 0.002
L.Consumer Conf. 2.462 0.205 -2.378 0.387
Constant 0.236￿￿￿ 0.000 0.165￿￿￿ 0.000 0.276￿￿￿ 0.000
Observations 120 93 93
R2 0.537 0.532 0.563
Adjusted R2 0.517 0.506 0.532
32Table 8: Macropartisanship models: FDP.
model 1 model 2 model 3
Coe⁄. p-value Coe⁄. p-value Coe⁄. p-value
L.Rel. Pship FDP 0.578￿￿￿ 0.000 0.549￿￿￿ 0.000 0.542￿￿￿ 0.000
L.Gov. Approval 2.750￿￿￿ 0.003 0.739 0.561
Merkel 0.001 0.725 -0.005 0.248 -0.004 0.408
Schroeder -0.009￿￿￿ 0.004 -0.014￿￿￿ 0.001 -0.013￿￿￿ 0.001
Kohl -0.007￿￿ 0.016 -0.014￿￿￿ 0.000 -0.013￿￿￿ 0.002
L.Consumer Conf. 2.292￿￿￿ 0.009 1.894￿ 0.087
Constant 0.024￿￿￿ 0.000 0.031￿￿￿ 0.000 0.030￿￿￿ 0.000
Observations 120 93 93
R2 0.728 0.698 0.699
Adjusted R2 0.716 0.681 0.678
Table 9: Macropartisanship models: Gr￿nen.
model 1 model 2 model 3
Coe⁄. p-value Coe⁄. p-value Coe⁄. p-value
L.Rel. Pship GR￿NE 0.834￿￿￿ 0.000 0.785￿￿￿ 0.000 0.781￿￿￿ 0.000
L.Gov. Approval 0.727 0.543 0.380 0.834
Merkel 0.015￿￿ 0.045 0.022￿￿ 0.013 0.022￿￿ 0.013
Schroeder 0.013￿￿ 0.029 0.019￿￿￿ 0.010 0.019￿￿￿ 0.010
Kohl 0.009￿ 0.074 0.016￿￿ 0.012 0.016￿￿ 0.017
L.Consumer Conf. -1.488 0.218 -1.720 0.296
Constant 0.003 0.197 0.002 0.588 0.003 0.568
Observations 120 93 93
R2 0.922 0.892 0.892
Adjusted R2 0.919 0.885 0.884
33